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Audit fee determinants in the Belgian 
health care sector 




External audit fees have been an important research topic over the last decades. Ever since 
Simunic (1980) - who was one of the first researchers of the explanatory factors of audit fees - 
a number of studies have been performed considering the profit sector (DeAngelo, 1981; 
Palmrose, 1986; Willekens & Gaermynck, 2005). More recently, the non-profit segment of 
the market has been investigated as well. Both in main context (Vermeer et al., 2010; 
Verbruggen et al., 2011) as in specific subsectors (Beattie et al., 2001; Mellett et al., 2007) 
non-profit audit studies have been performed. Verbruggen et al. (2011) attempted to explain 
the audit fee of 740 Belgian non-profit organizations. Differing circumstances (lower 
litigation risks, lower agency problems, no shareholders, ...) may explain differences between 
the profit and non-profit sector (cf. negative relationship between fee and specialization). 
Moreover the effect on audit fees also appears to depend on the sector the non-profit 
organization belongs to. However, as far as we know the health care sector - while being a 
very important part of the non-profit sector - has never been the subject of an audit fee study. 
Therefore, the current paper focuses on the Belgian health care sector and investigates the 
impact of its typical characteristics on the audit fee. A number of hypotheses derived from 
previous research in the profit sector as well as for non-profit research in general are 
developed and are extended by hypotheses regarding specific hospital characteristics. Do the 
number of hospital services and the legal status of the organization drive the complexity of a 
hospital audit? Especially the last part of this question makes this research most interesting. 
What about overhead costs in social welfare hospitals and university hospitals? Do they make 
the audit task more difficult and pricy? Regarding audit experience previous research shows 
somewhat contradictory results. Due to specific characteristics, such as the subsidy system, 
cost accounting consequences, complex medical care situation, the occurrence of non-
exchange transactions, external auditing in hospitals necessitates experience. On the one hand 
experience could lead to higher fees since the experienced auditor is able to obtain an audit 
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fee premium (Craswell et al., 1995), on the other hand experience could reduce the audit fee 
in that the experienced auditor is able to conduct the audit more efficiently and can transfer 
partly this efficiency to the auditee by allowing a lower fee (Cairney & Young, 2006). Using 
the classical OLS-strategy, answers to these questions were found. By adopting this ordinary 
least squares technique the unknown parameters can be revealed in a (multiple) linear 
regression model. Both variance of the model and individual impact of the explanatory factors 
were assessed this way.  
Ultimately the results revealed that the hospital status (and thus the overhead cost) does play a 
significant role in determining the price of the audit. So higher overhead costs lead to higher 
fees since there are more operating expenses such as labor costs, supplies and utilities. 
Furthermore, the number of assignments of the registered auditor is a significant indicator. 
The more specialized an auditor is, the lower the price is set. This is possible due to growing 
work efficiency or lowballing. Furthermore, the hospitals’ perception of external auditing can 
explain the lower fee as well. Historically the audit price for a hospital has initially been set 
low in the Belgian market (25 euros per bed). A lower importance and appreciation of 
financial audit from the hospital perspective therefore most be kept in mind. Overall the 
pricing model was found to be strong and parallel to non-profit studies (cf. Vermeer et al., 
2010; Verbruggen et al., 2011).  
Although the current study succeeds in delivering new insights in the relatively new domain 
of nonprofit sector audit fees, there are limitations to the study. Due to the complex process of 
data collection and lacking data, the number of hospitals under study is rather limited. 
Furthermore, the impact of internal audit for example is a yet undiscovered topic in hospital 
audit studies. Finally, the lower fees by specialist auditors need to be reassessed in order to 
determine whether they are the results of efficiency effects or lowballing. Given the fact that 
audit fees have only recently been made public in Belgium, future studies can also investigate 
the effect of price competition in this relatively specialized audit market. To this extent, the 
current study is an important starting point.  
Introduction 
Financial auditing implies the assurance in terms of true and fair view by the financial 
statements of an organization. Registered auditors are ordered to complete the audit 
assignment. Unlike internal audits the auditors are independent from the organization or the 
auditee. Before starting the audit assignment, the auditor agrees contractually on a fixed audit 
fee.
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Over the past decades audit fee determinants have been studied many times, mostly in the 
profit sector context. At this moment the number of non-profit audit studies is fairly scarce. 
The New Public Management (NPM) and its adoption in renewed regulations have led 
towards the professionalization of the non-profit market and a growing interest in audit 
studies. The NPM was the motive towards an accrual accounting system and an increased 
responsibility. A raising importance of performance as well as the use of management tools 
from the profit sector were consequences of the new regulations. Since there are so few 
publications of non-profit audit studies, much evidence is yet undiscovered. Audit pricing 
models have been tested in a wide range of sectors – exclusively the profit – in order to find 
out the influence of sector specific characteristics (auditee and auditor size, inherent risk, 
auditor specialization,…). There is an important lack of evidence considering the socio-
medical sector. This will be the central theme of the current study in which following research 
questions are set forward. To what extent do the previous researched factors explain the audit 
price (y-value) in a hospital setting? Are there any important differences? 
Simunic (1980) was one of the first researchers examining the explanatory factors considering 
audit fees in business enterprises. His research resulted in 3 main determinants: the size of the 
auditee (the institution being audited), the complexity of the auditee and the audit risk. On top 
of the main group Simunic found several additional determinants, such as being a Big 8
1
 
(nowadays Big 4) firm. This latter determinant was found to tend towards lower audit fees 
due to scale economies. This influential work was and still is a milestone in audit research and 
has inspired many others to continue the search for audit fee determinants in for profit and 
non-profit settings. In the next chapter a more detailed overview is being offered. 
Today non-profit audit fee research is starting to play a more significant role. A recent study 
of Verbruggen et al. (2011) focuses on the whole Belgian NPO sector, testing commonly 
known determinants as well as some added sector specific determinants (donations, subsidies, 
subsectors). To some extent the current study is a sequel of her study in that the current study 
attempts to explain the audit fee specifically in the hospital sector being an important part of 
the non-profit sector. 
Using the so-called OLS technique, typical fee determinants as well as certain hospital 
specific determinants are being tested. Since large NPO’s are obliged to publish their annual 
                                   
1 Big N: These accountancy firms are known to have international dominance considering audit, tax, corporate finance, 
assurance, … During most part of the 20th century the Big Eight were the largest accountancy firms: Arthur Anderson, Arthur 
Young & Co, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Whinney, Deloitte Haskins & Sells, Peat Marwick Mitchell, Price Waterhouse 
and Touch Ross. Later on the Big Six came into play and nowadays the Big Four are the dominant firms: PWC, Deloitte, 
Ernst & Young and KPMG. Earlier companies have merged leading to a smaller number of BIG N firms.  
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financial statements in the Central Balance Office of the National Bank of Belgium, many 
financial data can be retrieved this way. According to the Belgian accounting legislation, the 
Notes should disclose the agreed audit fee. However, only few hospitals disclosed the price in 
their Notes. By cooperating with the Belgian Institute of Registered Auditors most of the 
lacking fees have been traced.  
This paper consists of six sections. The first section draws a historical overview of audit fee 
evidence. Consecutively both purpose and associated hypotheses are being outlined. Section 
three focuses on the applied research method. The fourth section describes the several data 
sources of this study offering the opportunity of data triangulation. This is followed by an 
overview of all study variables in section five. The final section explains the preliminary 
conditions leading to the data analysis. Ultimately study limits as well as advice for future 
research are being pointed out.    
Previous research 
To this day a number of audit fee studies have been performed almost only regarding the 
profit sector leading to a notable amount of evidence. Today only a very limited number of 
studies considering fees in the non-profit market have been performed. Except from 
Bassioudis et al. (2005), Vermeer et al. (2009) and Verbruggen (2011), no major non-profit 
studies have been performed. Moreover these studies were often limited to evidence of the 
NPO market as a whole. That is why the focus on hospitals as a sector makes this study most 
interesting.  
Palmrose (1986) investigated the specific role of the larger audit firms being the Big 8 at that 
time. Contrary to Simunic (1980), she concluded that there is a significant association 
between auditor size and audit fee by using a dummy variable (Big 8/non-Big 8). Instead of 
following Simunic who claimed a tendency towards lower prices due to scale economies, she 
explains that the Big 8 acts as a cartel implying pricier audits. 
In the UK Chan et al. (1993) focused on the determinants of the fee of companies quoted on 
the stock exchange. Based on earlier findings and a semi-structured interview with four large 
audit firms, they created a pricing model by performing a multivariate analysis. Apart from 
known variables such as auditee size, report lag,… , three new explanatory variables appeared 
to be significant: auditee diversification, structure of the auditee property and whether or not 
having an audit setting in London. Using the findings of Simunic and other earlier studies, 
authors kept searching after new explanatory variables and adapted the fee model to a wide 
range of profit industries. Willekens and Gaeremynck (2005) sketched the price setting in the 
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Belgian enterprise audit market and started off by making a valuable summary of all (profit) 
audit fee studies between 1980 and 2005. 
Although profit evidence is inexhaustible, there are only a handful of non-profit studies 
considering audit fees. In the following paragraphs the main findings of non-profit evidence 
are being outlined. Beattie et al. (2001) published a remarkable article on audit fees. For the 
first time in history a model of audit fee determinants was developed to investigate the charity 
sector in the UK. In order to do so, three typical charity variables were added to the common 
fee model: nature (grant-making versus fund-raising), area of activity and importance of 
trading income. Secondly – unlike the private market - the smaller concentration of charities 
permitted a more powerful test to investigate the fee premiums of Big-N firms. In a more 
complex audit environment of fund-raising charities (former) Big 6 companies receive a 
higher fee than non-Big 6 auditors. By performing a size- and type-matched comparison 
between charities and private companies, the audit fee was found to be significantly lower in a 
charity setting. It is approximately the half of the average private company. Prudence is called 
for when similar comparisons between different sectors are performed. Every sector has its 
unique characteristics, which makes it more difficult to compare them with each other. 
In 2005 Bassioudis and Ellwood used the audit fee model of Simunic as a basis to investigate 
the audit fee market for National Health Service (NHS) Hospitals in England and Wales. The 
results of the study are contradictory to earlier research in the private market. Financial loss 
does not automatically lead to higher NHS audit fees. The fact that the government owns 
NHS trusts or that transitional funding often masks poor financial statements may be an 
explanation for this unique outcome. Auditor tenure also has a rather small impact. The main 
reason for these remarkable findings is the fact that the NHS audit market is regulated by the 
Audit Commission and has several unique features. External auditors have to undertake 
performance studies and are strictly limited considering the amount of further work. The 
English NHS market is a classic example of how audit markets can vary across different 
nations.  
A typical aspect of the non-profit market and especially the healthcare sector is resource 
dependency. Without their funds, hospitals would not be able to function properly. But what 
is the impact of this important factor on the audit fee? Vermeer et al. (2009) performed an 
interesting study, examining the American non-profit institutions. Apart from the well-known 
determinants of an audit fee model, they also investigated the role of resource dependency. As 
hypothesized, non-profit organizations depending on funds do include a higher audit risk 
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and/or additional audit monitoring activities, which leads to a pricier audit. Furthermore 
results showed that alternative monitoring mechanisms (cf. internal audit) are complements 
rather than substitutes for audit monitoring by an external auditor.  
Furthermore resource dependency has also been examined in the Belgian non-profit market. 
Van Caneghem et al. (2011) performed a survey considering governmental grants in the 
Belgian non-profit market. Hereby the focus was mainly put on resource dependency. No less 
than 55 percent of the respondents indicated the utility of an external audit to justify 
governmental grants. The financial and governmental audits were indicated to be 
complementary. It was Verbruggen (2011) who investigated the Belgian non-profit market for 
the first time ever considering audit studies. After analyzing the data of over 500 NPO’s, 
results were found to be opposite to the earlier findings of Van Caneghem and Vermeer. 
Dependence on governmental funds does not significantly explain the variance in audit fee 
levels. Several explanations can be given: subsidies do not increase the fee; the government 
does not pay any attention to financial audit information in the procurement process; only 
governmental auditors can audit subsidies; audit clients are not convinced of the fact that a 
higher audit quality is important to receive or justify subsidies.  
Research question-hypotheses 
The main goal of this paper is to verify to what extent the general approach made by previous 
research (cf. Verbruggen, 2011) is transferable to the particular context of a hospital setting. 
Hospitals do have a very important societal function providing health care which cannot be 
set forward in the profit sector. A huge amount of money comes into play requiring subsidies 
(e.g. public money) to operate optimally. The hospital audits are adopted to perform an 
accountability test, controlling whether the subsidies are well spent. Moreover the complexity 
of its production process makes a hospital unique and most interesting.  
To what extent does the outcome of a hospital audit fee model differ from the classic NPO (cf. 
Verbruggen, 2011)? Is the impact of the known explanatory variables similar? Are there any 
specific hospital features and what is there impact on the audit fee?  
Hypotheses  
As stated earlier, this paper was an opportunity to find out to what extent previous study 
findings are transferable to an important cluster of hospitals. On the one hand hospitals are 
similar to NPO’s to certain extent (since they are a subsector), on the other hand hospitals do 
also have additional proper features making them a unique setting with a typical financial 
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structure. What follows is an overview of the study hypotheses supported by previous 
research.    
Client size is a well-known determinant in audit pricing studies. Evidence of previous studies 
has shown its positive impact on the audit fee. Hay et al. (2006) performed a meta-analysis of 
audit fee determinant studies. One of the conclusions was that the client size is the most 
important explanatory factor. Magnitude involves more complexity, which ultimately leads to 
a higher fee.  
H1: The size of the hospital indicates the fee 
Furthermore evidence also reveals that size matters when considering the audit firm. 
DeAngelo (1981) stated that auditor size and quality are strongly related. Differences in Big4 
and non-Big4 capture differences in audit quality. Contrary to this traditional view Vander 
Bauwhede et al. (2004) could not find any evidence supporting quality differentiation in the 
private client segment of the Belgian audit market. Choi et al. (2010) performed a large-scale 
study over a period of five years (2000-2005). Main goal of the study was to find out in what 
way the size of a local audit office has an impact on audit quality and/or audit fee. Even after 
controlling on national level and expertise degree, results confirmed the significant positive 
relation between size and audit quality. Moreover auditor size has a positive impact on the fee. 
Usually a Big 4 dummy is added to investigate the size impact. Although Big 4 firms – such 
as Ernst & Young – can have a huge impact on the hospital sector, we may not forget about 
the non-Big 4 auditors. There are also important internationally organized non-Big 4 firms. 
Therefore, it is recommended to split up the non-Big 4 section into several subgroups 
(Verbruggen et al., 2011).  
What about the healthcare sector? When a Belgian hospital wants a Big 4 company to 
perform an audit, it will presumably have to open the purse reluctantly. As a cartel the Big 4 
companies have a stronger position (Palmrose, 1986) monopolizing the market. But apart 
from the Big 4 there are also auditor firms with a relatively big size, making the fee pricier. 
H2: Larger audit firms receive a higher audit fee  
The following two hypotheses (H3 and H4) both consider the complexity of a hospital setting 
and therefore belong together.    
Since there is no direct evidence on the relation between clinical services and fees, it is most 
interesting to investigate. Nevertheless there is some other related evidence explaining why 
this number can be an important research issue. In the year 1998 Chang published a valuable 
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study on hospital determinants and their influence on hospital efficiency in Taiwan. 
Performing a data envelopment analysis combined with regression, he concluded that service 
complexity (number of services) is negatively related to hospital efficiency. The bigger the 
scope of services, the more complex and difficult the task will be to manage the hospital. 
Apart from management difficulties, we can assume that the audit task will be more 
complicated as well. The more departments, the more complex the audit will be. This includes 
a bigger fee.  
H3: The number of clinical services is positively related to the audit fee 
Although the main part of the analyzed data comes from privately organized non-profit 
hospitals, there are also some publicly organized university hospitals and social welfare 
hospitals included as well. The latter two hospital types are special in the sense that they are 
strongly related to other governmental or private organizations. Whereas a privately organized 
non-profit hospital can be considered as a whole, university and social welfare hospitals 
belong to a bigger entity. Social welfare hospitals belong to social welfare institutions. It can 
be argued that the bigger the entity, the more overhead costs there will be. Overhead costs can 
be defined as a set of functions trying to guide and support the staff in the primary process: 
management, personnel and organization, facilities, IT, finances and control, communication 
and legal aspects. Other descriptions used by authors are indirect costs or secondary activity. 
Since the latter two are not always the exact same, this may cause some confusion.  
Especially in the profit there is existing evidence on the influence of the property form on the 
audit fee. Companies quoted on the stock exchange for example will be more likely to 
transform financial statements. Doing some creative accounting will complicate the financial 
audit. In 1994 O’Keefe et al. concluded that being quoted on the stock exchange leads to more 
complex audit assignments and higher audit fees.   
Overhead costs do complicate the audit task, having to take several units into account. We can 
presume that the audit price will be elevated if the auditor has to deal with more overhead 
activity. 
H4: Overhead costs are positively related to the audit fee 
The New Public Management has lead to a new legislation system, forcing very large NPO’s 
to apply an accrual accounting system and to undergo an external audit. Still, there are many 
sector regulations, demanding a variety of auditor skills (Christiaens, Vanhee, Verbruggen & 
Millis, 2008). Apart from the typical factors (such as auditor size, client size, financial 
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performance, …), there is a specialization factor influencing the audit process. Over the past 
decade evidence was mainly mixed. Obviously specialization can have a positive as well as a 
negative impact on the fee in theory. An audit client may be willing to pay for quality or the 
signaling effect of hiring a specialist.  
Mayhew & Wilkins (2003) defined auditor industry specialization as a combination of market 
share and differentiation skill within client industries. Making use of Initial Public Offering 
(IPO) audit fees they suggested that market share enables audit firms gaining competitive 
advantages considering cost and service. However a strongly differentiated strategy is 
necessary as well to obtain a stronger bargaining position including fee premiums. Besides it 
is also possible that specialization leads to an experience effect for the audit firm, implying a 
lower fee (Cairney & Young, 2006). According to this research team there is a cost-based 
competitive advantage since the cost of developing expertise can be spread over more clients. 
An older study (Craswell, Francis & Taylor, 1995) heads towards the opposite direction. 
Clients are willing to pay a fee premium for a market specialist. Carson & Fargher (2007) 
added value to earlier research by concluding there is a link between the client size and the 
given fee premium. This means that NPO’s – often a lot smaller than the listed companies – 
are probably less willing to pay a premium as high as for-profit companies.  
Verbruggen et al. (2011) also added a specialization variable to their price model. By 
applying a combined measure of both market and portfolio share of the audit firm, a weighed 
measure of auditor specialization could be tested. They hypothesized that the degree of non-
profit sector specialization is negatively related to audit fees. After applying an OLS-model, 
the hypothesis was confirmed. Non-profit organizations do receive a price reduction for non-
profit sector specialists. Possible explanations can be: no signaling effect due to stockholder 
absence, learning effects and lowballing
2
 in a price-conscious market. Continuing on the same 
line, we can hypothesize that Belgian hospitals pay lower premiums when an audit specialist 
is performing the external audit.  




                                   
2 Lowballing is a pricing technique and persuasion. Companies charge lower prices than actually intended. Eventually they 
will raise the price resulting in more profit. 




The conventional technique applied in audit fee determinant studies is the least square 
technique. Even in the early years of fee research (cf. Simunic, 1980) this method has been 
used. The pricing model is created by solving the typical linear equation. This statistical 
method is also known as the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).  
0 1x1 2x2 3x3 nxn  
The Y is the so-called dependable variable, the variable that needs to be explained. The X-
values are the independent or explaining variables. The -value constant acts as a substitute 
value for all the ‘forgotten variables’. Since some variables are not accessible (for instance 
due to the lack of public access), there will always be a margin of error. It is the -value that 
can be seen as a correction factor. In order to find out how strong a certain model is – in other 
words how well the X-values explain the Y-value – a determination coefficient R2 is being 
calculated. This coefficient has a value going from 0 to 100%. The bigger the R
2
 outcome is, 
the larger the explaining value of the model will be.  
 Data collection 
The annual financial statements of the Belgian hospitals can be seen as the base of this study. 
Since the New Public Management NPO’s (more specific the big and very big non profits) are 
obliged to hand over their annual statements to the Central Balance Sheet Office of the 
National Bank of Belgium (NBB), making them publicly. The names of all Belgian hospitals 
were found on the website of the association of Belgian hospitals (BVZ). 
The main issue in the data collection was the fact that there is a mix-up of two different types 
of financial reporting: on the one hand the general purpose financial reporting (NPO’s) and on 
the other hand there is also a specific type of financial reporting (Federal Public Service). This 
also explains why ultimately a sample of 71 hospitals were integrated (instead of all 111 
Belgian hospitals)  
I would like to conclude this chapter by saying that this part of the study was very intense and 
not to be underestimated. Not all data was centralized in the Central Balance Sheet Office. 
Moreover there were non-profit hospitals with an incomplete annual statements and therefore 
are not handed over in the approved manner. Apart from the National Bank, I also used data 
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from the IBR as a data source. The Institute was a great support and made it possible for me 
to get access to valuable data required for this study. Hospitals with incomplete annual 
statements were individually contacted and stimulated to communicate the lacking data. Apart 
from using these sources to complete my data set, the three sources were also compared to 
enforce the validity of the findings. Since there was an overlap, the justice of the data could 
be easily verified. The control of the financial data present in two or more sources was 
satisfying and thus not alarming. This research technique is also known as data triangulation 
(Guion et al., 2011).   
Defining the variables 
Which X variables do have a significant impact on the fee of a Belgian hospital? What are the 
differences/similarities compared to earlier non-profit evidence? Those are the main questions 
we want to resolve by adapting the OLS strategy.  
The variables X can be divided into three clusters: audit client (the Belgian hospitals in this 
case), audit firm (Big and non-Big 4) and audit engagement. Each cluster consists of several 
independent variables. Most X variables are similar to those adopted in earlier research. A 
few variables are new and typical for the hospital sector. Adding all these values to the 
pricing model will offer the opportunity to verify the hypotheses and determine the impact – 
whether or not significant – of all single X variables.  
Audit client, the Belgian hospital (H) 
In order to work efficiently, each variable is given a first letter of the cluster it belongs to. 
Hospital variables start with an H, audit firms with an F and engagement with an E. What 
follows is an enumeration of all variables assessing the risk and complexity of the audit client, 
the Belgian hospital. The arithmetic method is based on earlier research. I used the PhD of 
Verbruggen (2011) as a guiding line since it is a very recent article focusing on the NPO 
sector.  
Considering the size of the hospital, several variables can be distinguished. A typical measure 
is taking the natural log of the total assets (H_LNTA). Moreover the yearly mean of the staff 
(FTE) has also been implemented as a determinant (H_LNSTAFF). The natural log was used 
to deal with high levels of skewness. Another possibility – also applied in this study – is 
measuring the supply of the hospital (H_SUP/TA). Furthermore the accounts receivable on 
the total assets are scheduled (H_AR/TA). Both short and long term accounts receivable are 
taken into account (Willekens et al., 2005; Verbruggen et al. 2011).  
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Moreover there are some typical financial measures added to the pricing model in order to 
assess the audit risk: profitability (H_PROF), leverage (H_LEV), current ratio (H_CR) and 
subsidies (H_SUB). The latter variable deserves some particular attention. The subsidies are 
calculated by adding up accounts 700 and 701 of the annual statements. Account 700 is the 
price of hospitalization (calculated per day) and account 701 covers the outstanding amounts. 
Outstanding amounts are surplus or deficit receipts regarding to the Budget of Financial 
Means (BFM) settled for the current financial year (1
st
 of July until 30
th
 of June). As stated in 
the Royal Decree the BFM covers all costs considering hospital stay in a joint room, care 
delivery to the patients including daycare.   
To top off this list a dummy variable considering the hospital status is created 
(H_STATDUMMY). Is the hospital a typical NPO or is it a social welfare/university 
hospital? Since the latter two include more units, the audit is expected to be more complex 
and pricier.   
Audit firm (F) 
Traditionally audit studies add a Big 4 dummy to investigate the role of the audit firm size. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young and KPMG are 
considered to be the biggest auditors, having an enormous impact on the market. Nevertheless 
there are also huge non-Big 4 offices (cf. BDO & RSM Interaudit) that have a considerably 
larger impact compared with smaller non-Big 4 audit firms. Therefore the size of the firms 
has been divided in three sections: small, moderate and Big 4 settings. Subsequently the 
experience of the commissioner is added (F_EXP). By simply subtracting the year of taking 
the oath from the fiscal year, the years of experience were being exposed. To measure the 
audit specialization, the number of hospital engagements by each commissioner or partner is 
calculated (F_ENGAG). In his publication De Beelde (1997) has already stated that audit 
concentration is variable across countries and industries when he compared large audit 
companies situated in 14 countries. He also concluded that differences between audit firms do 
exist according to their specialist and generalist nature.  
Audit engagement (E) 
The report lag is a good indicator of the audit engagement (E_REPLAG). It is the time 
between the end of the accounting period and the day of the audit report. The longer this 
period lasts, the busier the auditor is which ultimately leads to a higher audit cost. 
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Typical a dummy variable for the decision of the audit is added (E_UNQUAL). The result 
may be unqualified or not. An unqualified decision means that everything is perfectly fine and 
in line with reality. In the other case, there are some obscurities that need to be verified. This 
makes the auditor task more difficult and pricy. 




Hospital Variable (H) Arithmetic method 
Expectation/relation 
to audit fee 
HLNTA (size) 
Total Assets 
Natural Log (skewness) + 
HLNSTAFF (size) 
Mean of yearly staff FTE 








Accounts Receivable and Inventories 
 





Privately organized NPO (0) or Publicly organized Social Welfare/University Hospital (1) 




(Supply + Accounts Receivable more than 1 year + Investments + Liquid + Prepayments 
and Accrued Income) / 




Price Day of Hospitalization + Outstanding Amounts + 
HSPEC 
Service Complexity 
Number of Hospital Services + 
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Audit Firm Variables 
 
Audit Firm Variable (F) Arithmetic method Expectation/relation to audit fee 
FSize 
Firm Size 
Small (0) and Medium (1) and Large (2) Larger size = higher fee 
FEXP 
Experience of Auditor 
Difference between Financial Year and Date of taking the Oath - 
FENG 
Engagements of auditor 
Number of hospital audits per partner - 
 
 
Audit Engagement Variables 
 
Audit Engagement Variable (E) Arithmetic method 
Expectation/relation 
to audit fee 
EREPLAG 
Audit Report Lag  
Difference between Annual Report Deposit/Audit report and the end of the 
Financial year (in days) 
+ 
EUNQUAL 
Final Audit Statement 
Unqualified (0) versus other than unqualified (1) 
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Results and discussion 
Preliminary conditions 
Ultimately 71 full hospital records were included in the study. When performing an analysis it 
is important to first control the quality of the dataset. Are there any abnormalities considering 
data range, extreme values, etc.? As a matter of fact there are three main conditions that need 
to be fulfilled before the actual linear regression can take place: control of descriptive 
statistics, normality check and multicollinearity analysis. As displayed in table 6 the 
descriptive statistics of all 12 variables (including dependable variable) don’t show any 
oddities at first sight and seem rather plausible. What about the HCR maximum? Although a 
current ratio can be quite high (for example when having a big supply or a small short-term 
debt), the range of 81 does attract attention. Possible extreme values like these might create 




 Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
HStat 1 0 1 ,08 ,28 
Ln HTotalAssets 4,15 15,64 19,80 18,32 ,95 
HLNStaff 3,62 4,83 8,46 6,57 ,88 
Hprof / HTA ,29 -,08 ,21 ,02 ,03 
HLev / HTA 2,15 ,23 2,38 ,57 ,26 
(HAR1+HAR2+HSup)/HTA 2,82 ,03 2,85 ,34 ,33 
HCR 81 ,26 81,26 3,57 10,33 
HHospspec 9 1 10 5,63 2,34 
FSize 2 0 2 ,52 ,79 
FExperience 35 1 36 21,00 7,32 
FEngagement 6 1 7 2,97 1,71 
EReportlag 113 135 248 185,24 19,78 
EUnqualdummy 1 0 1 ,23 ,42 
Ln Fee 4,05 7,08 11,13 9,56 ,83 
Valid N (listwise) = 71 
 
     
What happened to the variable HSub (hospital subsidy)? Accordingly to previous research (cf. 
Verbruggen, 2011) resource dependency and thus governmental financing does play an 
important role in NPO’s. This is also the case within the Belgian hospital sector. Still there are 
huge differences between a classic non-profit subsidy and a hospital subsidy. The latter one is 
not the typical non-exchange transaction as in the regular non-profit. In a Belgian hospital, a 
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subsidy has to be seen as an exchange transaction because a hospital service is being 
delivered in return. Moreover – apart from the price hospitalization and the outstanding 
amounts – hospitals do also receive smaller subsidies such as donations, legacies, subsidies on 
capital and interest, … Therefore it is very difficult to detect and capture all this information 
on subsidies. Due to these reasons the hospital subsidy was eventually removed from the data 
set.  
Are the data normally distributed? The Q-Q plots of both fee and independent variables reveal 
the normality of the dataset.    










The last step before heading towards the analysis is the multicollinearity checkup. What 
results does a bivariate correlation test show? Both assets and hospital specialization (number 
of services) had a correlation of over 60 percent with the hospital staff and were removed 
from the data set. From this moment on the data set was ready to perform the actual 
regression analysis. 
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Data analysis, multiple linear regression 
Similar to Verbruggen et al. (2011) the OLS technique is used to clarify the impact of the variables X (hospital, audit firm and engagement 
variables) and the dependent variable Y (ln fee). What percentage of the variance in Y can be explained by the set of independent variables? Is 
the model significant at all? Which independent variables do have a significant impact on the audit price? What does the final linear equation 
look like?  






Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R Square Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 















Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 3,10 1,05  2,96 ,005 
HStat -,94 ,32 -,32 -2,96 ,004 
HLNStaff ,80 ,09 ,84 9,17 ,000 
Hprof / HTA -,98 2,22 -,04 -,44 ,659 
HLev / HTA ,46 ,28 ,14 1,62 ,110 
(HAR1+HAR2+HSup)/HTA -,17 ,23 -,07 -,75 ,454 
HCR ,02 ,02 ,01 ,86 ,394 
FSize ,24 ,09 ,22 2,60 ,012 
FExperience ,01 ,01 ,05 ,54 ,592 
FEngagement -,10 ,04 -,20 -2,36 ,022 
EReportlag ,01 ,00 ,15 1,64 ,107 
EUnqualdummy -,34 ,18 -,17 -1,91 ,061 
 
The model is significant is significant at the 1% level (p<0,001) as shown by the ANOVA or analysis of variance  (F=10,697). This means that 
the model is strong and that the set of independent variables as a whole is a good predictor of the audit fee. Moreover the adjusted R square value 
is very satisfying. No less than 61,1% of the variance in Y is explained by the set of variables X. What about the impact of each separate variable 
X? After applying the OLS technique, four independent variables were found to have a significant impact on the fee: hospital status, hospital 
staff, audit firm size and number of engagements of the commissioner. 
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What does this result mean? What effect does this outcome have on the hypotheses in table 
two? What follows is a brief summary of the impact of each separate independent variable. 
Six hospital variables have been added to the model. The variable HStat was implemented to 
find out whether overhead costs do complicate the audit assignment, increasing the audit price 
(H5). Results show that HStat has a significant impact (p at 5 percent level) on the fee, 
supporting the fifth hypothesis. Since no similar evidence has been found considering the 
impact of hospital status on its fee, a new variable can be added in the existing set of hospital 
fee determinants (theory building). The second variable HLnStaff is also a significant 
predictor of the audit fee (p at 1 percent level). This does not come as a surprise. Since the 
hospital staff is strongly related to the total assets and is a good size indicator, we could 
expect a good link with the fee. The rest of the hospital variables (profitability, leverage, 
accounts receivable/inventory and current ratio) do not have a significant impact on the audit 
price. Although these variables do not have significant p values, they do help explain the 
variance in the fee (Y) and therefore are also added to the linear equation above.  
Apart from the client characteristics, the audit firm and engagement are also taken into 
account. Two firm variables were found to have a significant impact at the 5 percent level: 
FSize and FEng. In other words, the two hypotheses we wanted to test in table 2 are 
supported. H1 stated that larger audit firms imply pricier audits. Instead of using the classic 
dummy, this study divided the firms in three groups: small, medium and large audit firms (cf. 
5.2. defining variables section). The bigger the audit firm, the pricier the fee will be. H2 stated 
that hospital specialization has a negative impact on the fee. The study results do support H2 
as well. The more audit engagements a commissioner has, the less pricey the fee will be. No 
significant link was found between auditor experience (FExp) and audit price. The latter two 
independent variables added to the model were the engagement variables. According to the 
results, the report lag and the conclusion of the commissioner (unqualified or not) do not have 
a significant impact on the fee.  
In brief we can infer that all hypotheses from table 2 are supported, except for H4. Since 
hospital specialization correlated for over 60 percent with the variable HLnStaff, the variable 
HSpec was removed from the data set (cf. 7.1, preliminary conditions).   
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Conclusions and issues for further research 
This paper adds value to existing audit fee research, since it is the first time that determinants 
in the specific sector of hospitals have been investigated, except for a study in the UK where 
the emphasis was put on NHS hospitals (Basioudis & Ellwood, 2005). Hence, current study 
has international significance, since evidence considering audit fees in the health sector is 
rather limited. Contrary to typical NPO publications current study also included hospitals 
established by governments, i.e. social welfare and university hospitals. This study also took 
these hospitals into account, investigating the impact of overhead costs. By investigating the 
relationship between hospital status and audit fee, we add an interesting and yet undiscovered 
feature to existing audit fee evidence. 
Hospital status has a significant impact on the fee. Why would social welfare and university 
hospitals have to pay more than a classic non-profit hospital? Again the explanation is not far 
away. Social welfare (or article XII) hospitals have strong connections with their local social 
welfare institution. This latter unit plays an important role considering management and 
control of its hospital(s). This implies that when performing an audit of a social welfare 
hospital, more overhead costs have to be taken into account. The same may be said for 
university hospitals. They too are linked to another institute that is the university itself. Whilst 
non-profit hospital audits only have to take one unit into account, social welfare and 
university hospital audits are more complicated since more units are involved. Overall it can 
be stated that publicly organized hospitals are governmental institutions. Therefore more 
regulations and social goals come into play ultimately leading to more overhead costs, more 
complex audits and higher fees. 
Apart from the hospital size, audit firm magnitude also significantly determines the fee. Since 
many earlier studies report an important impact of the firm size on the fee (DeAngelo, …), 
this result does not come as a surprise. There are also medium sized firms having a larger 
impact on the price comparing to the smaller ones (cf. BDO & Interaudit). 
The latter variable that is significantly related to the fee is the auditor specialization captured 
by the number of hospital audits by commissioner. Although evidence is rather mixed, there is 
a tendency towards a negative impact. Verbruggen (2011) mentioned the bargaining power of 
the auditor. When an auditor has more assignments in a particular market segment and is 
more specialized, he is able to lower the audit price due to grown work efficiency. This means 
that commissioners with a high number of hospital assignments set a lower price than those 
with less hospital audits. Furthermore the perception of the audit can have an impact as well. 
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Nowadays hospitals do not fully understand and valorize audit. Therefore auditor specialists 
do not receive a higher fee. Since the Federal Public Service only subsidized 25 euros per 
hospital bed, hospitals were urged to guard the fee and limit the fee as much as possible. 
Audit opinion and report lag are very important to hospitals because they financially depend 
on the government. The government can be seen as a supervisory institute, controlling the 
overall functioning of the hospitals. As long as these latter ones can prove sufficient quality, 
they receive subsidies as a financial support. Furthermore the birth of the New Public 
Management has put more pressure on the non-profit, stimulating the market to be more 
transparent. Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness (three E’s) are brought into prominence. 
Both the government and the New Public Management force the Belgian non-profit to offer 
assurance. Therefore audit opinion and report lag also play an important role in determining 
the audit fees in the Belgian hospitals. The fact that also the impact of hospital leverage (long- 
and short-term debts) tends towards significance could be expected as well. Unlike Vermeer 
et al. (2009) who studied American NPO’s, leverage does drive the inherent risk of the 
hospital audit and thus the fee. Again the new legislative system and the monitoring 
government come into play. 
The OLS analysis already led to a valuable 61,1 percent with a small, but diversified dataset. 
Still several possible determinants have not been implemented in the model: internal control 
of the hospital (audit committee), prestige, audit partner effect, … According to Hogan et al. 
(2008) ICD or Internal Control Deficiency firms do pay more for the external audit. Well 
functioning audit committees can spot and eventually resolve audit difficulties in an early 
stage, making the external audit less difficult. It can be hypothesized that a high level of 
internal control leads to lower audit fees. Prestige is a rather difficult determinant to capture 
that may have an impact on the audit fee. Since the number of university hospitals is fairly 
low in Belgium, some commissioners may be willing to (seriously) lower their audit price. 
They may find it a great achievement to be the number one auditor of a well-known hospital. 
Another interesting aspect of an audit relation is the audit partner effect. During the European 
study day (IBR) J. Van Buuren – associate professor in accounting at Nyenrode Business 
University – talked about the PhD he presented in 2009. After a thorough investigation of the 
audit partner effect within Dutch companies noted on the stock exchange, he concluded that 
an audit assignment must be seen as an organic and dynamic event. Human capacity and 
behavior certainly play a role as well.  
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